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Abstract:  
The relationship between financial-system reform and growth is of continuing interest 
and the subject of ongoing research; yet many aspects of it remain unclear.  This 
paper contributes to the literature by an analysis of this relationship using Chinese 
time-series data.  China is a particularly interesting subject for such a study since it  
has undergone rapid and wide-ranging financial liberalisation since economic reforms 
began in 1978 thus providing a rich source of data.  We construct an index of 
financial liberalisation by combining the ‘Delphi method’ and principal components 
analysis to combine eight aspects of the reform process for 1978 to 2004. We tackle 
the question of the finance-growth nexus by estimating and simulating a VAR model 
of growth, saving and liberalisation.    We find robust evidence of significant positive 
effects of liberalisation on growth in the short run and on accumulated growth in the 
long run but weak and predominantly negative effects of liberalisation on saving.  
Tests of short-run Granger causality show that liberalisation significantly causes both 
growth and saving but that there are no significant feedbacks to liberalisation.   
 
 
Keywords: financial reform, financial liberalisation, economic growth, saving, 
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I. Introduction 
While China’s financial history can be traced back 1000 years, the current 
banking system dates from the 1948 establishment of the People’s Bank of China 
(PBC). For the next 30 years, from 1949 to 1978, the PBC was the only and 
all-inclusive bank and it played very much a subordinate role in a centrally-controlled 
economy in which the government subjected the banking sector to stringent controls; 
there was no stock market, the interest rate structure was distorted due to extensive 
interest rate controls and credit was allocated bureaucratically to preferred end users, 
notably state-owned enterprises.   
As part of the reform and “opening-up” which began in 1978, China’s authorities 
also undertook financial reform, liberalising the tightly controlled financial system.  
Since then reform of the financial system has proceeded apace and has been 
wide-ranging; it has included the relaxation of interest-rate controls, the removal of 
bank credit quotas, the diversification of financial institutions, the establishment of a 
comprehensive financial regulatory system, the implementation of an exchange rate 
regime based on a basket of currencies and greatly improved access of foreign 
financial institutions to Chinese markets. 
While there is a growing literature examining the developing Chinese financial 
system, there has been little work which uses Chinese data to address the 
finance-growth relationship even though this is an area with a rapidly expanding 
international literature in recent years, particularly as an outgrowth of the renewed 
interest in the empirics of economic growth; the recent comprehensive survey of 
finance and growth by Levine (2005), for example, lists around 300 references.  
Many of these use the cross-section or panel data sets previously compiled by those 
working in the empirical analysis of economic growth, albeit supplemented by 
additional financial variables.    Relatively few studies have used time-series data for a 
single country, partly because of the lack of variation over time of financial 
development variables due to the slow pace of financial reform in most countries.  
There have been calls, however, for the use of time-series data to overcome some of 
the limitations of the dominant panel-data approach and China’s experience provides a  3
rich data set, given the rapid reform which its financial system has undergone since 
the late 1970s. 
We exploit the Chinese experience to make several contributions to the literature.   
First, we use an approach based on time-series data in contrast to the dominant 
cross-section methods.  This enables us to pay more attention to the exogeneity of 
the finance variables and address questions of causation. Second, we focus on 
financial liberalisation rather than the broader notion of financial development.    This 
allows us to be more confident that our finance variable, being largely policy-driven, 
is exogenous and not likely to be contemporaneously contaminated by economic 
growth. 
A further contribution lies in the way in which we address two difficulties that 
arise in our focus on policy-driven financial liberalisation: policy changes are often 
difficult to quantify and are also multidimensional.  We overcome both these 
difficulties in an innovative way, the first by using the “Delphi” method for 
constructing a number of sub-indexes measuring different aspects of the liberalisation 
process and the second by using principal-components analysis (PCA) to combine the 
various sub-indexes into a single financial liberalisation index.     
We are able to address three issues widely debated but, as yet, unresolved in the 
literature – the sign of the effect of liberalisation on growth, the effect of liberalisation 
on saving and the causality directions between liberalisation, saving and growth.    We 
find, consistent with most other evidence that the growth rate of per capita real output   
is stationary so that liberalisation cannot affect steady-state growth although it does 
have a positive effect on the long-run level of output and on growth during the 
transition. The effect of liberalisation on saving is found to be weak.  Finally, 
liberalisation Granger-causes growth in the short run but there is no causation running 
from either growth or saving to liberalisation. 
This paper is organised as follows. In section II we provide a brief review of the 
literature on which our work is based, including both theoretical and empirical 
literature on the finance-growth nexus, although, given space constraints and the 
availability of the recent Levine (2005) survey, we focus on studies using Chinese  4
data.  Section III briefly describes financial sector policy and financial deregulation 
in China over the past 30 years to provide a basis for the construction of our 
financial-liberalisation index (FLI). The modelling framework is set out in section IV.   
In section V we describe the data, paying particular attention to the construction of the 
FLI and discussing some of its properties.    The results are presented in section VI in 
which we begin with the presentation of the estimated model, then use the model to 
address the causality question and end by reporting some sensitivity analysis.  
Conclusions are drawn in section VII.   
 
II. Literature Review 
The past 15 years have seen an explosion of the literature dealing with finance 
and growth, both theoretical and empirical, which has been comprehensively 
summarised in the recent survey by Levine (2005).  In this section we give only a 
brief account of the literature dealing with the theory underlying the relationship 
between growth and financial development and of the international empirical 
literature and focus, instead, on the relatively few papers dealing with China.   
At the outset it is worth making a distinction we will exploit later in the paper, 
viz., that between financial development and financial liberalisation resulting from the 
reform of the financial system.  In simple terms, we think of financial liberalisation 
as being the outcome of specific policy action to remove regulations etc. which 
restrict the way in which the financial system can operate.  This will generally lead 
to financial development in which mechanisms and institutions develop which 
improve the functioning of the financial system.  Thus we think of financial 
liberalisation as preceding financial development although, of course, not all financial 
development will be the result of the removal or relaxation of financial regulations 
and restrictions and in this way financial development will be broader than financial 
liberalisation.   
Most of the literature analyses the effect on growth of financial development; 
Levine (2005), e.g., sets out to “describe models where market frictions motivate the 
emergence of distinct financial arrangements [which] … may influence economic  5
growth” (p.869).
1  But from a policy point of view, the growth effects of financial 
liberalisation is a more immediate question and we argue that a focus on liberalisation 
may also reduce the likelihood of econometric endogeneity which has dogged the 
interpretation of empirical results. 
 
II.1 Financial development and growth: the theory 
In the 1950s and 1960s it was widely believed that keeping interest rates 
(artificially) low would stimulate economic development since interest costs are part 
of the cost of capital so that keeping rates low encourages capital formation and hence 
growth.      In the 1970s, McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) persuasively challenged 
the efficacy of such financial repression, and argued that allowing interest rates to rise 
to market-clearing levels encourages investors to shift from non-financial to financial 
assets.    As a consequence, the domestic financial system is able to extend more loans 
to investors and the equilibrium rate of investment increases with consequential 
beneficial effects on economic growth.    The analysis by McKinnon and Shaw began 
a long-term movement in favour of financial liberalisation, the growing view in 
favour of a market-determined interest rate being reinforced by additional arguments 
raised by authors such as Kapur (1976), Galbis (1977), Mathieson (1980) and Fry 
(1980) who pointed to the enhancement of the efficacy of monetary policy resulting 
from free financial markets.   
This view was not without dissenters, however.  Neo-structuralists such as  
Taylor (1983) and van Wijnbergen (1982, 1983a, 1983b) stressed the importance of 
informal financial markets and argued that if curb or unorganised money markets are 
important and competitive, an increase in intermediation by the banks may simply 
move money from one market to another.    Moreover, given the likelihood of reserve 
requirements in the formal market, such a re-allocation may actually reduce the total 
amount of funds available for investment although Kapur (1992) and Bencivenga and 
Smith (1992) point out that this argument may be weakened if the central bank makes 
                                                        
1  A recent exception is the paper by Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2005) which focuses on liberalisation but 
restricts its attention to the equity market.  6
efficient use of the banks’ reserves.     
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) focused attention on microeconomic underpinnings of 
credit markets, showing that, although credit rationing may reflect financial repression, 
it may continue to characterise financial markets even after they are substantially 
liberalised.   
More recent theoretical work in the general area of finance and economic growth 
has been extensively surveyed by Levine (2005).  Like  Pagano’s  (1993) brief survey 
more than a decade earlier, he distinguished several channels through which financial 
development may influence economic growth.  The main channels distinguished by 
Levine are (i) the improved information provided by a developed market which leads 
to more efficient allocation of capital across potential projects, (ii) the improved level 
of monitoring of investments leads to greater investor confidence which improves the 
supply of funds to the market, (iii) improved risk spreading, (iv) mobilisation of 
savings and (v) the facilitation of exchange. 
Both the first two effects are likely to stimulate the supply of funds and so the rate 
of economic growth although, to the extent that the effects work through improving 
the rate of return to savers, the opposite might be the case due to the well-known 
off-setting income and substitution effects of a rise in the interest rate on saving.  
Similarly, as Levine points out, the facilitation of risk pooling may also reduce the 
supply of savings as agents reduce saving for a rainy day although the ability to pool 
small savers’ funds for investment in large projects is likely to improve the supply of 
savings and therefore the funds available  to  investors.   
Thus, in contrast to the more optimistic conclusions reached in the earlier 
literature regarding the beneficial effects of financial development on growth, the 
more recent literature shows that, while there may still be a general presumption to a 
positive effect, there are sufficient theoretical ambiguities to stimulate empirical 
research.   Empirical analysis has also focussed on the question of the relative 
importance of the channels through which finance affects growth.  It is no surprise, 
therefore, that the recent upsurge in empirical literature on the determinants of 
economic growth in general has been extended to include measures of financial  7
development in an attempt to arrive at an empirical resolution of these theoretical 
ambiguities. 
 
II.2 Financial development and growth: the empirical evidence 
Levine (2005) divides the empirical literature on finance and growth according to 
the empirical approach used: cross-section or cross-country studies, time-series 
studies and panel studies.     
A substantial body of empirical work assesses the impact of the operation of the 
financial system on economic growth by using cross-sectional approaches. Building 
on earlier work by Goldsmith (1969) and the World Bank (1989), an influential study 
by King and Levine (1993) analysed the relationship between financial development 
and growth using a data set consisting of 77 countries over the period 1960 to 1989 
which was extensive enough to allow them to systematically control for factors other 
than financial development as well as providing a variety of alternative measures of 
financial development.  They found a strong and robust positive relationship 
between measures of financial development and economic growth.    In addition, they 
were able to exploit the time-series dimension of their data to conclude that financial 
depth in 1960 had considerable predictive power for subsequent economic growth, 
thus going some way to disentangling the correlation/causation conundrum.  Work  in 
a similar vein such as that by Amable, Chatelain and de Bandt (2002), Bencivenga 
and Smith (1991), Bencivenga et al.(1995), Benhabib and Spiegel (2000) and La Porta 
et al. (2002) generally supported the King and Levine results although extensions to 
include stock market development by Atje and Jovanovic (1993) and Levine and 
Zervos (1998) and bond markets by Fink et al. (2003) produced results which show a 
weaker relationship between development of these markets and economic growth.   
Although the existence of a positive relationship between finance and economic 
growth even after allowing for other growth determinants is now widely accepted, the 
empirical findings based on cross-country data do not settle the issue of causality. 
While many researchers would argue that ultimately questions of causality can not be 
completely resolved empirically, time-series approaches have been employed in the  8
finance and growth literature to throw additional light on the issue.  Moreover, the 
application to time-series data for a single country often allow for the use of more 
detailed data on financial development as well as abstracting from country-specific 
differences which may confound the cross-country studies.  Some papers have used 
data for a single country (Rousseau, 1998, Rousseau, 1999, and Rousseau and 
Sylla,1999) while others have estimated models individually for a number of 
countries (Demetriades and Hussein, 1996, Arestis and Demetriades, 1997, Rousseau 
and Wachtel, 1998, Neusser and Kugler, 1998, Arestis et al., 2001, and Xu, 2000).  
While the results have been mixed, there is general evidence of Granger-type 
causality from finance to growth although several studies do not rule out causation in 
the opposite direction.     
Finally, consider a small number of recent studies based on Chinese data.  Two 
early (and similar papers) by Li and Liu (2001) and Liu and Li (2001) examine the 
relationship between “financial liberalisation and growth in China’s economic reform” 
by regressing aggregate GDP growth on investment growth disaggregated into four 
components according to the source of funding, the argument being that the source of 
funding has changed with the development of the financial system so that it provides 
(indirect) evidence about the effect of such development on growth.  Thus, they 
conclude that a shift from state appropriation to self-raised funds has stimulated 
economic growth, providing evidence of the positive effects of development on 
growth.   
More recent papers include those by Allen et al. (2005), Hao (2006) and Liang 
and Teng (2006).  Of these, the last two both directly address the finance-growth 
question, the former using a panel of provincial data and the latter aggregate 
time-series data.  Liang and Teng use traditional financial development measures 
representing bank credit and the deposit/liability ratio while Hao argues that such 
measures tell only part of the story and finds that the financing method (the switch 
from state budget appropriations to loans as in Liu and Li, 2001, above) and the 
volume of saving are more powerful determinants.  Hao concludes that “the 
development of financial intermediation exerts a positive, causal and economically  9
large impact on China’s economic growth” (p. 361) while the results in the paper by 
Liang and Teng are more ambiguous: there is no causation from financial 
development to growth but some evidence that causation runs in the opposite 
direction. 
Finally, we briefly mention several Chinese-language papers:  Shen and Sun 
(2004), Wen, Ran and Xiong (2005) and Zhang and Jin (2005).  The first uses 
aggregate time-series data for the period 1978 to 2002 and find that the connections 
between the financial system and investment efficiency and the percentage of 
domestic savings used for investments are limited.  The third paper, by Zhang and 
Jin (2005), uses a provincial level panel data set and concludes that productivity 
growth is significantly positively related to financial depth.   
We may briefly conclude this review of the literature by saying that the 
international literature, particularly that based on cross-country data sets, points 
reasonably strongly to a positive relationship between financial development and 
growth.  There are some limitations of the literature, however, which motivate our 
work.  First, most of that literature concentrates on financial development and not 
liberalisation as such (which is our interest).  Second, the results obtained using 
time-series data suggest greater caution regarding the direction of causation between 
finance and growth.  Finally, empirical work using data on China is very sparse and 
inconclusive.   
Thus, much work remains to be done and we contribute to the literature in various 
ways.    First, we focus on financial liberalisation which, being policy-driven, is likely 
to suffer less from endogeneity than general measures of financial development and is, 
therefore, more likely to clearly resolve the causality issue.  Moreover, financial 
liberalisation is more policy-relevant than financial development in general.   
Secondly, we use time-series data which will better enable us to address the causality 
issue.  Thirdly, we use data for China for the period since reforms began in 1978.  
The significant and continuing reforms during this period should help us avoid a 
common problem with the use of single-country time-series data, that there is 
relatively little variation in the data since in most cases liberalisation proceeds slowly.    10
Finally, as is clear from the literature survey, little is known about the Chinese case 




III. An overview of financial liberalisation in modern China 
Economic reform has proceeded apace since ‘opening-up’ began in 1978 and 
financial deregulation has been a central part of this reform.  We present a brief 
survey of the main aspects of liberalisation which we classify as follows: the 
diversification of financial institutions, the reform of credit quotas, interest rate 
deregulation, the establishment of a financial regulatory system, the development of a 
stock market, increased openness to the rest of the world, and the development of the 
financial legal framework.
2 
We begin with institutional diversification.   In 1978 the formal financial system 
consisted of a single bank, the People’s Bank of China (PBC) which accepted deposits 
and channelled funds according to government credit-allocation policy.  Subsequent 
development saw an enormous increase in diversity of financial institutions, 
beginning with the development of a two-tier banking system between 1979 and 1993 
during which four state-owned banks (SOBs) were established to carry out the PBC’s 
banking business, leaving the PBC as a central bank.     
The central government also provided for the establishment of a broader range of 
banking institutions such as the urban credit cooperatives (UCC) which flourished 
during this period and small- and medium-sized  commercial shareholding banks, 
focussing mainly on regional borrowing and lending.  The government encouraged 
competition between these new institutions and the SOBs, although the latter were 
still subject to a good deal of policy direction.     
In 1994 the SOBs were relieved of their policy-lending obligations with the 
creation of three specialised policy banks which dealt with policy-lending, leaving the 
                                                        
2  These correspond to the first seven of eight aspects covered by our financial liberalisation index, the last aspect 
of which is a general policy variable.  11
SOBs to concentrate on commercial banking.  During this period the rural credit 
cooperatives (RCCs) and the city commercial banks (CCBs) were allowed to develop 
rapidly and the first shareholding banks funded completely by private capital were set 
up, greatly increasing the diversity and competition in the banking system. 
By 1997 non-performing loans (NPLs) had reached alarming proportions and 
there followed a period of consolidation and financial restructuring in the Chinese 
banking system, including the consolidation of 1,658 RCCs into 81 joint stock city or 
rural commercial banks. 
The final distinct stage of institutional diversification began in 2001 and has been 
largely outward looking prompted by China’s joining the WTO.  There was also 
continued privatisation of the SOBs with two having been listed and the other two in 
preparation for doing so.  Consolidation and rationalisation of existing institutions 
continues. 
   The credit allocation system was highly centralised before 1978, being 
arranged through the PBC and its branches according to the credit plan, which was 
prepared in the form of a source-and-use-of-funds statement to match the estimated 
demand for physical resources. After 1984 the specialised banks were allowed a 
certain freedom in the use of funds although they were still obliged to submit 
projections on loans and deposits to the PBC for approval with credit quotas being 
strictly enforced. The PBC finally removed credit quotas for the SOBs in 1998, 
moving instead to the implementation of management principles based on 
asset-liability ratios. 
China has taken a cautious approach to the deregulation of centrally controlled 
interest rates. During the pre-reform period, interest rates were controlled by the PBC 
and fixed at very low levels and rarely varied.  In 1983 the PBC first allowed some 
interest-rate flexibility for the SOBs when floating interest rates were introduced for 
certain types of working-capital loans. In 1986 banks were allowed to adjust lending 
interest rates within a narrow band about the administered rate, but such flexibility on 
deposit interest rates was not granted.    Since 1993 the PBC has taken steps to widen 
the floating band on lending rates for financial institutions and to adjust the reference  12
rates more frequently.   The PBC also began to set a reference rate for the inter-bank 
market in January 1996; the inter-bank bond market was launched in June 1997; and a 
market-based auction method began to be used in October 1999 for all government 
bonds.  In October 2004, the upper limit on the loan rates charged by commercial 
banks was removed and that for the rural and urban credit cooperatives was raised to 
2.3 times the benchmark rate. A lower limit was no longer applied to the interest rate 
of RMB deposits. Therefore, by late 2004 interest rates on both sides of bank balance 
sheets were largely market-determined. 
In the area of the financial regulatory system, the PBC as central bank was first 
designated as the key agent for financial market supervision in 1984 and officially 
retained this function until 1992. During this period the Bank exercised 
comprehensive regulatory as well as administrative jurisdiction over the entire 
financial sector. With the two major stock exchanges emerging in 1990, the State 
Council Securities Commission (SCSC) was established to develop policies for 
financial markets, although it did not become a full-blown regulator.  This task was 
assigned to the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), created in 1993.   
However, until the strengthening of the CSRC through its merger with the SCSC in 
1998, the State Council issued most of the path-setting rules and policies that govern 
financial markets. The CSRC eventually became the only regulatory and supervisory 
institution for securities markets in 1999.     
In 1998 the China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) was entrusted with 
the supervision of insurance companies, including preparations for the opening of the 
insurance sector to foreign players.  In April 2003 the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission (CBRC) was established to take over the regulatory function of the 
banking sector from the PBC in order to leave the PBC free to concentrate on 
monetary policy matters.   
The reserve requirements system in China was established in 1984 with the 
statutory reserve ratio initially very high by the standards of developed financial 
markets – up to 40% for some deposits.  The reserve requirements were unified and 
reduced to 10 per cent for all deposits in 1985 but increased to 13 per cent in 1987, a  13
level which was maintained until 1998 when it was reduced to 8 per cent and further 
to 6 per cent in 1999.   
The development of China’s stock market is one of the most important elements 
of China’s reform of the financial system and China’s stock market has experienced  
amazing growth since its beginnings in the early 1990s although its capitalisation still 
accounts for only a small part of total financial assets. 
In December 1990 and July 1991, two stock exchanges, the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange were established.  A unique feature of 
the Chinese stock market is the two types of shares, A shares and B shares traded on 
each exchange.  A shares are exclusively sold to Chinese nationals and trade is 
carried out in local currency.    B shares, the first of which were listed on the Shanghai 
exchange in February 1992, are traded in foreign currencies (Hong Kong dollars in 
Shenzhen and US dollars in Shanghai) by foreign investors.  Since February 2001, 
domestic investors are also allowed to trade in B shares, although trading is still in 
terms of foreign currency.    In addition to the A and B shares, Chinese companies can 
issue H shares on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, N shares on the New York Stock 
Exchange and S shares on the Singapore Stock Exchange but these account for 
relatively little of their capitalisation.  Since the late 1990s many state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) have listed but with a large proportion of their shares being 
non-tradable state-owned shares.     
In order to increase the supply of funds to the domestic share market, the CSRC 
instituted the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) system in December of 
2002 by which limited access was given to foreign investors in A shares.  On June 25, 
2004 China launched a new small and medium enterprises board on the Shenzhen 
Exchange. On April 29, 2005, the CSRC announced the resumption of reforms to 
address the imbalance between tradable and non-tradable shares and by the end of 
2006, 95% of the listed companies issuing A shares had at least begun participation in 
the reform process.    State-owned share holdings are still substantial, however. 
China’s reform of international financial relations has been slow and cautious. 
Before 1978, China under Mao Zedong was largely closed to the outside world but  14
since reform began it has gradually widened its economic relationships with the rest 
of the world although decision-making concerning external liberalisation has been 
highly  centralised.   
In early liberalisation China maintained a dual exchange rate system until the 
beginning of 1985 when the rates were unified.  Strict foreign exchange controls 
continued in force although these were relaxed to encourage foreign direct investment 
(FDI) for various coastal cities during the 1980s as part of the “opening-up” process.  
In 1988, the FDI policies were expanded to another 140 coastal cities and counties.  
In April 1991, the official exchange rate regime was changed from one of periodic 
adjustment to a managed float, allowing the authorities to adjust the rate more 
frequently.  In 1994, the foreign exchange retention and quota system was repealed 
and replaced by a foreign exchange surrender and purchase system which realised 
conditional current account convertibility.  In late 1996 China moved to full current 
account convertibility. 
The Asian financial crisis in the second half of 1997 prompted the strengthening 
of capital controls and monitoring until 2000 although during this period foreign bank 
access was improved, a liberalisation which was boosted by China’s accession to the 
WTO.  Over the last 5 years external liberalisation has been extensive to include 
banking, foreign exchange markets and capital markets. 
We turn, finally, to the development of the legal framework. Anecdotal evidence 
of widespread violation of the principles of good governance in Chinese financial 
markets has been persistent despite considerable advances made by the authorities in 
establishing and enforcing laws and regulations to control the financial system. Laws 
covering banking, administration, corporations, bankruptcy and solvency, the stock 
market and insurance have been drawn up and promulgated particularly since the 
early 1990s when it became clear that China’s integration into the international 
financial system would require a legal framework conducive to the attraction of 
foreign capital and foreign expertise.    Despite a plethora of legislation and regulatory 
activity, it must be remembered that this is occurring within the context of a 
developing and emerging financial system during a period of rapid economic,  15
financial and political transition. With the deepening of China's financial system, the 
accelerated opening-up to the rest of the world and the rapid innovations in the 
financial sector, the legal framework is barely able to keep pace with the changing 
requirements of the financial sector and great efforts will be required on the part of the 
authorities to bring China’s financial system framework into the 21
st century.   
In conclusion, there has been rapid, substantial and continual change in the 
Chinese financial system from 1978 onwards.  We have described a system which 
less than 30 years ago consisted of a single government-owned bank and which has 
developed into a highly diversified, sophisticated system serving a dynamic economy 
with over 1.3 billion inhabitants.  It may well be argued that there have been 
significant hiccups in the reform process and that there is still substantial development 
necessary before China has a smoothly functioning, transparent and modern financial 
system.    Whatever the merits of this argument, from the point of view of the work to 
be reported below, there is no danger of too little variation in the liberalisation index, 
making for bland econometrics. 
 
IV The Model 
We motivate our empirical model by a simple growth model based on Pagano’s 
(1993) modification of the ‘AK’ model of economic growth to capture the influence 
of financial liberalisation.   We adapt his model to remove the unattractive feature of 
the AK model that it implies policy has permanent effects on growth as recognised in 
the recent semi-endogenous growth literature starting with Jones  (1995a).   
Before setting out our formal model, we begin by referring to Pagano (1993) and 
the recent survey by Levine (2005) to identify the main channels through which 
financial liberalisation may influence growth.  They are various and may be 
summarised as follows. 
(a) Liberalisation effects greater economies in financial intermediation which results 
in greater efficiency of saving-investment  conversion.    
(b) Improved information collection and processing improves the allocation of funds 
to competing investment projects and the monitoring of projects so that a given  16
amount of funds is more efficiently allocated and there is greater growth for a given 
amount of investment. 
(c) Financial liberalisation will improve returns to investment and therefore the 
rewards for saving (say, by relaxing financial repression) and the volume of saving. 
(d) Financial liberalisation will reduce risk associated with investment and therefore 
the riskiness of returns to saving and therefore the volume of saving.   
Following the literature, we recognise that only the first two channels are likely to 
result in a positive relationship between financial liberalisation and growth while the 
sign of the relationship between channels (c) and (d) may be positive or negative – in 
the case of (c) because of the opposite signs of income and substitution effects and for 
(d) a reduction in risk may lead to smaller precautionary saving.     
We capture this informal theorising in an set of equations derived from a simple 
growth model which starts with based Pagano’s (1993) adaptation of the AK model of 
endogenous growth.  We adapt his model to accommodate recent criticism of the  
implication of the model that in the steady state the growth rate is a function of the 
level of technology so that, say, exogenous technical progress implies an 
exponentially increasing growth rate. As Jones (1995a) has pointed out, this is clearly 
at odds with the stylised fact that the growth rate is constant over long periods of time 
even when there is continuing technical progress.  To anticipate our results, we also 
find that the rate of growth of real per capita GDP is stationary over our sample period.   
We therefore modify Pagano’s analysis along the lines of Jones (1995a, b).   
We begin with a simple Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns 
to scale: 
(1)   Y  =  A.K
α .L
(1-α),     0 < α<1 
where Y is real output, A is the productivity or knowledge, K is the capital stock and L 
employment.  In  intensive  form: 
(2)   yt =A.k
α. 
The rate of growth of per capita output is determined by productivity growth and the 
rate of growth of the capital-labour  ratio.  Using  Gx to denote the proportional rate of 
growth of x, we have:  17
(3)   Gy = GA +αGk  
Capital accumulation is driven by investment, I less depreciation.    We follow Pagano 
(1993) and allow some saving to be lost in the process of financial intermediation so 
that investment is some proportion, Φ, of saving S so that the rate of growth of the 
capital stock is given by: 
(4)   GK = ΦsAk
(α-1)-δ  
where s is the saving rate, S/Y and δ is the depreciation rate.    Finally, the growth rate 
of the per capita capital stock is given by: 
(5)     Gk = ΦsAk
(α-1)-δ-n  
where n is the exogenous rate of population growth.  This is a standard result in the 
basic neoclassical growth model apart from the inclusion of the parameter Φ and 
produces a stable equilibrium in which the steady-state level of k satisfies the 
condition: 
(6)   k
(α-1) = (n+δ)/ΦsA  
so that all of n, δ, Φ, s, and A may influence the steady state level of k (and therefore 
of y) but its rate of growth is determined by: 
(7)   Gk = (1/(1-α))GA  
and the steady-state rate of growth of per capita real output is given by: 
(8)   Gy = GA/(1-α)  
which is independent of the level of technology as well as of the saving rate and the 
saving conversion rate, all of which may be affected permanently by financial 
liberalisation policy.  Thus, we have a model with an equilibrium in which the level 
of per capita real output may be influenced by policy (through s, A and Φ) but in 
which the growth rate is determined solely by the rate of technical progress which we 
take to be exogenous. 
   To formulate our empirical model, we focus on the saving rate, s, the 
efficiency with which saving is converted to investment, Φ, and the efficiency of 
investment, A to write the per capita output growth equation (dropping the y subscript) 
as:   
(9)     Gt = G(Φt, At, st)  18
We use the model above to constrain the effects of these variable son the growth rate 
to be only temporary.  From our earlier discussion of the influence of financial 
liberalisation on growth, we could assume that each of the arguments of equation (9) 
is a function of a financial liberalisation index, FLI: 
(10)     Φt = Φ(FLIt) 
(11)     At = A(FLIt) 
(12)     st = s(FLIt) 
Substituting these into equation (9), produces a single equation for G in terms of FLI: 
(13)     Gt = G(FLIt) 
which would provide a basis for a simple bivariate model involving the growth rate 
and a measure of financial liberalisation.    But recall that the different channels do not 
all have the same unambiguous sign so that there is something to be gained by 
keeping s as a separate variable in the model to enable us to test whether the effect of 
FLI on G through its effect on s is positive or negative and whether this effect 
dominates that through the other two channels.   We, therefore work with the 
slightly less aggregated model consisting of: 
(14)     Gt = G(FLIt, st) 
(15)     st = s(FLIt) 
In this model the direct effect of FLI on G (through the presence of FLI in the G 
function) captures the effects through both A and Φ in equation (9).     
To estimate this model we need to address some important econometric issues.  
Apart from the need to specify the functional form, a core question is that of 
endogeneity which has played a central role in the empirical growth literature.  If 
FLI were a general indicator of financial development such as are commonly used in 
the empirical literature, there would be a strong presumption of endogeneity for all 
three variables.  We will, however, focus on largely policy-driven financial 
liberalisation (rather than financial development) and, while this might be endogenous 
in a political sense over the longer term, it is less likely to be so within the period (a 
year for our data set) than would be the case for financial development.    This would 
leave both G and s potentially endogenous.  Despite our presumption of the  19
exogeneity of FLI, we will specify a model in which all three variables are potentially 
endogenous.    In particular, we will use a VAR model in G, s and FLI as our empirical 
framework which allows all three variables to be endogenous and will also allow us to 
test the direction of causation between the variables using standard Granger causality 
tests.  Given our time-series approach to the issue and the relatively short sample 
period after financial-system reforms began in 1978, we are precluded form using 
additional control variables commonly found in the growth literature using large 
cross-section data sets.  To some extent some, of these influences such as stock 
market developments and the increasing openness of the economy will be captured in 
the FLI index to be explained below but ultimately we are data-constrained – with a 
maximum lag length of four, three variables require the estimation of 13 parameters 
per equation with only 27 observations using up one half of the degrees of freedom.  
Adding even one control variable would add a further four parameters to each 
equation as well as an equation to the model.     
Our econometric procedure will therefore be to linearise the model, test the 
variables for stationarity with our final model specification depending on the outcome 
of the stationarity and, if appropriate, cointegration tests.  To  anticipate  that  outcome, 
we find G to be stationary and s and FLI to be non-stationary and not cointegrated so 
that we estimate a vector autoregressive (VAR) model of the form: 
(8)    x t = a0 + A(L)xt-1 + εt,   t  =  1,2,  …,T          
where xt = (Gt, Δst, ΔFLIt)’, a0 is a 3-element vector of constants, A(L) is a matrix 
polynomial in the lag operator, L, Lxt = xt-1, and εt is a 3-element vector of random 
error terms, each with zero mean and no autocorrelation.     
With this general modelling approach, we will be able to avoid the complicated 
debate in the growth literature surrounding endogeneity, the appropriate treatment of 
this problem from an econometric perspective and the interpretation of the resulting 
estimates.  The model’s implications for the interactions between FLI, G and S will 
be explored using impulse-response functions (IRFs) which show the effect on each 
of the endogenous variables over time of a shock to one of the equation errors.  We 
will also use pairs of bivariate equations to test short-run Granger causality between  20
each pair of variables and so address the important question of whether liberalisation 
causes growth (in the Granger sense) or vice versa and whether saving causes growth 
or not. 
 
V The data 
The data we need for the estimation of the model specified in the previous section 
are relatively modest since it has only three variables: G, s and FLI.   
Our data are annual and the sample period runs from 1978, the beginning of the 
reform period, to 2004.  The growth rate, G, was measured by the proportional 
change in real GDP per capita, the saving rate, s, was measured by the ratio of saving 
to GDP where saving was derived as the difference between GNP and total 
consumption (including government consumption).  The source of data for both 
these series was China Statistical Abstract (State Statistical Bureau, various issues). 
The construction of the liberalisation variable requires a more extensive 
description.  The measurement of financial liberalisation in a form suitable for 
econometric investigation is problematical for at least two reasons: how can the 
process of financial liberalisation be measured numerically and how can the 
multi-dimensional nature of liberalisation be accommodated in a single or relatively 
few variables? 
The most common response to the measurement problem has been to use readily 
observable financial variables such as the ratio of bank loans to GDP.  While this 
may be an acceptable approach for the measurement of financial development, for the 
purposes of measuring the extent of financial liberalisation it seems unsuitable.  At 
best, as we have already argued, it measures the outcome of the liberalisation process 
and not the process itself and, moreover, it is likely to be the outcome of the 
interaction between liberalisation and growth rather than a driver of growth itself.     
An alternative resolution of the measurement problem is to examine the history  
of liberalisation itself and construct an artificial index of liberalisation by assigning 
numerical values to particular deregulatory events although this is limited by a certain 
arbitrariness in the assignment of numbers to  events.  This  difficulty  notwithstanding,  21
a similar approach has been widely used in the literature on institutions and growth to 
capture the evolution of the political environment (see Glaeser et al., 2004, for a 
recent example) and in the recent paper by Bekaert et al. (2005) on the growth effects 
of equity market liberalisation. 
The second problem associated with the construction of a liberalisation variable is 
that of the multi-dimensional nature of liberalisation.  In contrast to much of the 
literature on finance and growth which uses a single or a limited number of measures 
entered as regressors simultaneously, we construct a variable which combines in a 
single measure the multiplicity of components.    An early application of this approach 
to a cross-country study of stock market development is by Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine (1996), and subsequently by Love (2003).  Single index-based measures of 
varying degrees of sophistication have been used in work by Bandiera et al. (2000), 
Laeven (2003), Koo and Shin (2004) and Koo and Maeng (2005).  It has also been 
used in literature in political science; see Quinn (1997), Adsera et al. (2001) and 
Abiad and Mody (2005).   
We build on this literature and proceed by constructing sub-indexes for eight 
aspects of the liberalisation process, thus covering the multiple facets of the 
liberalisation process.    The eight aspects are: 
•  ‘institutions’: the diversification of financial institutions,   
•  ‘allocation’: the reform of credit allocation,   
•  ‘interest’: interest rate deregulation,   
•  ‘regulations’: the establishment of a financial regulatory system,   
•  ‘stock’: the development of a stock market,   
•  ‘open’: increased openness to the rest of the world,   
•  ‘legal’: the development of the financial legal framework, and 
•  ‘policy’: major central government policy shifts. 
.We overcame the subjectivity of the assignment of numbers to deregulatory 
events by using the Delphi method.    This involved choosing 15 experts (a mixture of 
academics in the area of finance and economics, commercial bankers, central bankers 
and government officials) and asking them to rate each of this set of eight aspects of  22
liberalisation over the sample period, assigning a value between 0 and 1 for each 
aspect for each year of the sample.  The resulting 15 individual responses were 
averaged to derive a sub-index for each aspect ranging between 0 at the beginning of 
the sample to 1 at the end.     
We analysed the individual responses to detect outliers and it was interesting (and 
reassuring) that the individual responses were highly correlated, indicating a high 
degree of common assessment of the regulatory changes over the period.    Thus, e.g., 
the correlation matrix for the individual assignments for the first aspect, “institutions”, 
(reported in Panel A of Table A1 in the Appendix) shows that most correlations are 
well in excess of 0.9.  Average correlations for the remaining aspects (Panel B of 
Table A1) show similar results and indicate that there are no respondents who are 
consistent outliers.  We are reasonably confident, therefore, that the responses are 
reflective of generally perceived changes in the regulatory structure of Chinese 
financial markets over the sample period.   
We then proceeded to combine the eight sub-indexes into a single index, FLI,   
using principal-components analysis, a technique that has been used for the same 
purpose in some of the paper cited above.  Principal-components analysis is a 
method of long standing to assess and summarise the common contents of a set of 
variables.  Consider a set of K variables Xk (k=1,2,…,K), each with T observations, 
combined in the matrix X.  The  cross-products  matrix  X’X has K eigenvectors ak and 
associated eigenvalues λk.  If we arrange the eigenvectors and eigenvalues in 
decreasing order of magnitude of the eigenvalues we can define the kth principal 
component of the X matrix as 
     Zk = X.ak 
and the ratio (λk/∑λk) measures the proportional contribution of the kth principal 
component to the total variation in the X variables.  Then if, as is usually the case, 
the first one or two principal components capture most of the variation in the Xks, we 
can use them (individually or in a linear combination) to summarise the information in 
the data set.     
In Table 1 we report the eigenvalues of the eight possible components as well as  23
the proportion and the cumulative proportion of the variation in the variables 
explained by each.  It shows that the first principal component explains by far the 
greatest proportion of the variation in the individual sub-indexes and that the first two 
principal components explain over 97 per cent of total variation.    We use a weighted 
average of the first two principal components as the FLI, with the weights being the 
proportion which each explains of total variation.  In the last two columns of the 
table we report the loadings on the eight variables for the first two principal 
component (the elements of a1 and a2); they show that the first principal component is 
roughly a simple average of the eight variables while this is not true of the second.
3  
Table 1 about here 
A graph of the first two principal components and the FLI is given in Figure 1 
b e l o w .     
Figure 1 about here 
The FLI clearly increased monotonically over the sample period reflecting the 
general impression that reform is cumulative on the whole – while there may be   
particular reforms which are wound back (temporarily), the general thrust of reform of 
the financial system in China has been a continuing one.    There have, however, been 
several episodes when reform appears to have accelerated (or, more precisely, has 
been perceived by the experts surveyed to have accelerated).     
In the early years following the demise of Mao Zedong and the consolidation of 
power by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, reform seems to have proceeded slowly and 
cautiously.  There was a spurt, however, starting in 1984 which reflects the 
establishment of the People’s Bank of China as the central bank in April 1984.    This 
event affected the FLI in various ways – through the credit control, institution 
building and prudential regulation components of the index.  The establishment of 
the People’s Bank coincided with the institution of a system of statutory reserve 
requirements for the banks – the ratio was initially set very high but substantially 
reduced in 1985. 
                                                        
3  Note that, for the purposes of the second, third and fourth columns, the numbers in the first column refer to the 
components, the Zks (of which there are a maximum of eight), whereas for the purposes of the last two columns 
the numbers in the first refer to the Xks.    24
Reform seems to have faltered somewhat between 1985 and the early 1990s.  
The first half of the 1990s saw steady institution building and diversification, 
relaxation and modernisation of the system of credit controls as well as the opening 
up of the financial system to the world economy with the move to a managed floating 
exchange rate.  The brief reform spurt in 1998 coincided with the removal of direct 
credit controls, the consolidation of the system of reserve requirements and the greater 
flexibility in the way in which banks could set their interest rates.  Finally, an 
acceleration of reform in the two last years of the sample reflects continued institution 
building, the further relaxation of interest rate controls and, in 2005, the substantial 
changes to the foreign exchange arrangements. 
The overall behaviour of the index therefore looks plausible in the light of events 
in the Chinese financial system over the period.  Before turning to the use of the 
index in our econometric analysis, we briefly consider the relationship between FLI 
and more common measures of financial development to assess our conjecture that 
liberalisation is likely to precede financial development.  W e use three measures of 
financial development commonly used in the literature: FIR (financial assets to GDP 
ratio), DEPTH (the ratio of M2 to GDP) and CREDIT (total credit to GDP).    Table 2 
reports the results of tests of Granger causality between these variables and FLI.  It 
provides strong evidence that FLI Granger causes all of these variables but is caused 
by none over our sample period.     
  Table 2 near here 
In each case the null hypothesis is that the first variable does not cause the second; 
so, for example, 7.4057 is the value of the F-statistic for a test that FLI does not 
Granger-cause CREDIT.  The associated marginal significance level of less than 1 
per cent means that the null hypothesis can be rejected and we conclude that FLI 
Granger causes CREDIT.  On the other hand, CREDIT does not Granger-cause FLI.  
This pattern is repeated for each of the other two measures of financial development 
we use.  Thus, there is strong statistical support for our earlier proposition that 
financial liberalisation precedes financial development and we argue that FLI is, 
therefore, less likely to be plagued by endogeneity than common measures of  25
financial development are. 
 
VI Results 
We begin by testing each of our variables for stationarity.    Since the model does 
not constrain the form of the variables, we experiment with both the levels and logs of 
the s and FLI variables.    Augmented Dickey-Fuller statistics are reported in Table 3.     
Table 3 near here 
In each case we start with a test equation with the lags chosen to maximise the 
Schwarz Information Criterion and no trend and then add a trend.  The table reports 
the ADF statistic as well as corresponding 5% critical values for each of G, s, FLI, lns, 
and lnFLI for a test with and without trend.  We also report the lags used.  Where 
the level or log of the variable is clearly non-stationary, we also report the ADF test 
for the first difference with the first-difference operator being denoted by Δ.  In this 
case we do not include a trend and report results for tests with and without an 
intercept.  It is quite clear from the table that the growth rate is I(0).  The saving 
rate in both level and log forms is clearly non-stationary and the first difference of its 
log is stationary with and without an intercept while in level form the first difference 
is effectively stationary at 5 per cent.  We conclude that s is I(1).  FLI is clearly 
non-stationary whether in log form or not and the first difference is stationary in level 
form with an intercept (which is significant using a standard t-test in the 
Dickey-Fuller equation) and in log form without an intercept (which is insignificant in 
this case).    We conclude that FLI is also I(1). 
[Figures 2 and 3 near here] 
Our finding of the stationarity of the growth rate is consistent with the weight of 
the evidence for other countries and supports our model specification that constrains 
the steady state growth rate to be unaffected by either the pace of financial 
liberalisation or the saving rate.  A graph of the growth rate is given in Figure 2 
which shows that growth has no perceptible trend and that, while it fluctuates widely, 
it appears to return to its mean of a little over 8 per cent.  The findings that the 
saving rate and the FLI index are non-stationary is not surprising in the light of the  26
graphs of the two variables in Figures 1 and 3.  Both have a distinct upward trend 
and the saving rate in particular has wide highly autocorrelated fluctuations about this 
trend.  While the saving rate is bounded above and must eventually level, there 
appears little evidence that this has begun to happen during our sample period.  In 
the steady state therefore it must be stationary as assumed in our growth model of 
section IV even though over our sample it clearly is not.    A possible characterisation 
would be in the distinction in Jones (2002) between the long run and the steady state 
where in the long run some variables may grow which in the steady state are constant.   
A similar argument may be made with respect to the FLI index – eventually the 
opportunities for financial liberalisation will become limited and the index would be 
expected to level off. 
Given that two of our three variables are I(1), we proceed next to tests of 
cointegration for s and FLI.    Johansen trace and eigenvalue tests of cointegration are 
reported in Table 4 for two pairs of variables, (s, LFI) and (lns, lnFLI).  
Table 4 near here 
We conducted the tests with both one and two lags. We also report results with and 
without a trend term in the cointegrating vector.  Clearly s and FLI are not 
cointegrated and this does not depend on whether there is a trend in the cointegrating 
vector or whether a trace or an eigenvalue test is used or whether one or two lags are 
used in the VECM framework.    The results for the logs of the variables are not quite 
so clear-cut, there being weak evidence that there is cointegration at 10 per cent when 
there is no trend in the cointegrating vector and the VECM has one lag and at the 5 
per cent level when there are two lags.  However, examination of the VECM shows 
that one lag is sufficient to ensure the absence of autocorrelation in the model errors.  
Hence we conclude that the balance of the evidence is clearly on the side of no 
cointegration and we proceed to the estimation of a model in G, Δlns, and ΔlnFLI.   
We also experimented with a model in G, Δs, and ΔFLI (although we do not report 
these results) and found that the overall implications of the model do not depend on 
whether the variables are in logs or not.     
The lag length for the VAR model was selected on the basis of the usual list of  27
criteria (the values of which are reported for various lags in Table A2 in the Appendix).   
The criteria clearly point to a lag length of three; tests for autocorrelation in the 
residuals show that we cannot reject the absence of autocorrelation in the model 
residuals at lags higher than one but that there is substantial autocorrelation with only 
one lag.    All the results considered, therefore, we use a lag length of three, although 
we also explore the dynamics of models with one, two and four lags to assess the 
robustness of our conclusions.    The estimated model ( which is reported in Table A3 
in the Appendix) shows a satisfactory degree of explanation (given that the equations 
are either growth rates or log differences) and no autocorrelation so that it adequately 
explains the time-series variation in the data.     
For the examination of the model’s implications for the dynamic interaction 
between the three variables, we rely on the impulse response function (IRF).  In 
particular, we are interested in the effects on G and s of a shock to FLI.  The three 
(cumulative) IRFs for an FLI shock are pictured in Figure 4. The IRFs are based on 
the Choleski decomposition of the model’s covariance matrix. This ensures that the 
errors which are shocked are independent but has the well-known limitation that the 
resulting IRFs may be sensitive to variable ordering if the equation errors are strongly 
contemporaneously correlated (see, e.g., Enders, 2004, Chapter 5).  Our preferred 
ordering is FLI, s and G so that within the period, FLI may affect both other variables, 
s may affect G but not FLI  within the period and G itself affects the other two 
variables only with a one-period lag.    This seems most in keeping with our model in 
which liberalisation affects growth in the transition both directly and through its effect 
on saving, while saving and growth have no obvious contemporaneous effect on 
liberalisation although it is possible that high growth may generate an environment 
where liberalisation is more likely to occur.    To assess the sensitivity of our results to 
this assumption we reverse the order of s and G in the model and also check for 
Granger causality between each pair of variables. 
Figure 4 near here 
The IRFs show that the effect of the shock to FLI has the largest effect on itself 
and that this effect is positive.  An increase in liberalisation also has a significant  28
positive long-term cumulative effect on growth but a predominantly negative effect on 
saving, although the effect on saving is not significant.  The positive cumulative 
effect on growth is consistent with the model’s implication that a change in FLI can 
have a level but not a growth effect since the accumulation of growth is simply the 
effect on the (log) level of per capita GDP.     
The ambiguity of the sign of FLI in the saving function of the model is resolved 
in the positive at a short horizon but this positive is more than offset by a subsequent 
negative effect by four years after the shock and, besides, is relatively small.  
However, this predominantly negative effect of liberalisation on saving is not 
sufficient to offset the direct positive effect on output. 
These conclusions are not affected by (i) reversing the order of s and G, (ii) 
varying the lag length in the underlying VAR from three to two or four, (iii) 
estimating the model in levels rather than logs of saving and liberalisation.  In all 
cases the  increase in liberalisation significantly boosts real output per capita over a 
substantial period but has little effect on saving – the saving effect tends to be 
negative and insignificant.  There is therefore strong evidence that liberalisation has 
been of significant and long-term benefit to China in terms of permanent output 
effects without influencing steady-state growth.   
This conclusion is further enhanced by the results of our tests for Granger 
causality.  In Table 5 we report the results of pair-wise tests for short-run Granger 
causality. The results show that, in the short run at least, the change liberalisation 
Granger-causes both growth and the change in saving, although the growth effect is 
significant only at a marginal significance level of 8 per cent.  There is no reverse 
causality in either case – the change in liberalisation is not caused by either growth or 
the change in saving.  Finally there is no causation running from growth to the 
change in saving and only very weak causation from that change in saving to growth 
providing further evidence that the effect of liberalisation on growth captured by the 
IRFs must run through channels other than the saving effect. 
Table 5 near here 
These results are in stark contrast to those reported by Liang and Teng (2006)  29
who also use aggregate time-series data for China and find that there is causality 
running from growth to financial development but not from development to growth.  
Liang and Teng, however, use two measures of financial development (ratios of bank 
credit to GDP and bank liabilities to GDP) rather than a liberalisation index as we do 
and we have argued above that there are theoretical reasons to believe that financial 
development variables of the type they use are likely to be the joint outcome of 
growth and liberalisation and so obscure (and possibly reverse) the causality analysis.   
Moreover, they use data back to 1952 whereas we start with the beginning of reforms 
in 1978.  Since they do not entertain a break in the process at 1978, we can only 
speculate as to the effect of the pre-1978 data on the results. 
VII Conclusions 
This paper has analysed the relationship between financial liberalisation and 
economic growth using aggregate time-series data for China from 1978 to 2004.       
We constructed a unique liberalisation index based on the Delphi method in 
which 15 experts assigned index values to each of eight different aspects of 
liberalisation for each year of the sample period.    The correlation of the respondents’ 
allocation of values to the aspects were found to be highly correlated with each other, 
showing a remarkable degree of agreement as to the pace and timing of liberalisation.     
In our empirical work we estimated and simulated a VAR model based on a 
simple neoclassical growth model adapted to include the influence of financial 
liberalisation.    Our results show that the growth rate is stationary which is consistent 
with the recent criticism by, e.g., Jones (1995a, 1995b), of the implications of the 
endogenous growth model.  Thus growth cannot be affected in the steady state by 
liberalisation although there may be transitional effects and steady-state effects on the 
level of per capita GDP.  Our simulations show that this is indeed the case.  A 
permanent increase in liberalisation has a positive cumulative effect on growth so that 
long-term per capita output is boosted.  However there are weak and predominantly 
negative effects of liberalisation on saving providing strong evidence that the effect on 
output occurs through direct channels rather than indirectly through saving. These 
results were shown to be robust to variable definition, to VAR specification and  30
variable ordering.  In subsequent tests of short-run Granger causality we found that 
the change in liberalisation significantly causes both growth and the change in saving 
but that there are no significant feedbacks from either of these variables to the 
liberalisation index.    31
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1 7.379  92.232  92.232  0.132  0.044 
2 0.411  5.134  97.366  0.134  -0.052 
3  0.084 1.053  98.420  0.124 0.926 
4 0.057  0.714  99.134  0.129  -0.691 
5 0.031  0.386  99.520  0.131  -0.521 
6 0.016  0.204  99.724  0.134  -0.125 
7  0.012 0.155  99.879  0.126 0.833 
8 0.010  0.121  100.000  0.132  -0.341 
 
Table 2: Tests of Granger causality between FLI and financial development 
Variables F  statistic  p-value 
FLI → CREDIT  7.4057  0.0039 
CREDIT → FLI  0.4007  0.6751 
FLI → DEPTH  3.8050  0.0398  36
DEPTH → FLI  1.0210  0.3783 
FLI → FIR  12.1080  0.0004 






Table 3: Tests of stationarity 
Variable Test  (C,T,L)
 1  ADF test statistic  5% Critical value  Stationary? 
(C,0,3) -3.5573 -2.9981  Yes 
G 
(C,T,3) -3.6262 -3.6220  Yes 
(C,0,1) -1.1213 -2.9862  No 
s 
(C,T,3) -3.0034 -3.6220  No 
(C,0,0) -2.9756 -2.9862  No 
Δs 
(0,0,0) -2.7821  -1.9550  Yes 
(C,0,1) -1.2475 -2.9862  No 
lns 
(C,T,3) -2.9704 -3.6220  No 
(C,0,0) -3.1238 -2.9862  Yes 
Δlns 
(0,0,0) -2.9564  -1.9550  Yes 
(C,0,0,) 2.1782 -2.9810  No 
FLI 
(C,T,0) -1.2747 -3.5950  No 
(C,0,0) -3.5855 -2.9862  Yes 
ΔFLI 
(0,0,1) -0.7823  -1.9557  No 
(C,0,6) -2.5605 -3.0207  No 
lnFLI 
(C,T,6) -2.7273 -3.6584  No 
(C,0,6) -2.0434 -3.0300  No 
ΔlnFLI 
(0,0,1) -2.5314  -1.9557  Yes 
1  ‘C’ indicates an intercept, ‘T’ a trend and ‘L’ lag length.  In all cases lag length is chosen to maximise the 
Schwarz Information Criterion for the “Dickey-Fuller equation”. 
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Table 4: Tests of cointegration 
Panel A:    s and FLI 
p-values for 
H0: no. of cointegrating vectors  Trend/ no trend  Lags  Test type 
None  At most 1 
No. of 
CVs 
Trace 0.3338  0.0485 0 
Trend 1 
Eigenvalue 0.6828  0.0485  0 
Trace 0.6395  0.5680 0 
No trend  1 
Eigenvalue 0.7224  0.5680  0 
Trace 0.1748  0.1515 0 
Trend 2 
Eigenvalue 0.2405  0.1515  0 
Trace 0.2458  0.8805 0 
No trend  2 
Eigenvalue 0.1195  0.8805  0 
Panel B: lns and lnFLI  
p-values for 
H0: no. of cointegrating vectors  Trend/no trend  Lag  Test type 




Trace 0.0955  0.0208  0 
Trend 1 
Eigenvalue 0.3557  0.0208  0 
Trace 0.5067  0.2887  0 
No trend  1 
Eigenvalue 0.7983  0.2887  0 
Trace 0.0436  0.0719  1 
Trend 2 
Eigenvalue 0.0885  0.0719  0 
Trace 0.2622  0.6911  0 
No trend  2 
Eigenvalue 0.6911  0.6911  0 
 
 
Table 5: Tests of Granger causality between growth, saving and FLI 
Dependent variable  Explanatory 
variable  G  Δlns  ΔlnFLI 

















Note: the table contains F-statistics (with p-values in parentheses) for a test of Granger causality from 
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Figure 4: Cumulative IRFs following a shock to ΔlnFLI 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1: Correlation of individual responses 
Panel A: Correlations for “Institutions” 
1 . 0 0 0                 
0.989  1.000               
0.980  0.985  1.000              
0.983  0.989  0.980  1.000             
0.979  0.988  0.953  0.981  1.000            
0.952  0.950  0.932  0.971  0.966  1.000           
0.946  0.950  0.913  0.967  0.977  0.993  1.000          
0.940  0.974 0.935 0.957 0.913 0.923 0.944 1.000               
0.943  0.942 0.936 0.978 0.957 0.989 0.979 0.929 1.000             
0.986  0.996 0.993 0.994 0.980 0.946 0.940 0.970 0.951 1.000           
0.879  0.838 0.840 0.823 0.857 0.774 0.766 0.763 0.770 0.838 1.000         
0.950  0.976 0.965 0.934 0.957 0.941 0.930 0.812 0.906 0.961 0.862 1.000       
0.977  0.998 0.972 0.977 0.996 0.953 0.960 0.888 0.943 0.990 0.871 0.974 1.000     
0.985  0.994 0.977 0.998 0.994 0.974 0.974 0.977 0.973 0.993 0.824 0.962 0.994 1.000   
0.979  0.987 0.963 0.994 0.996 0.983 0.986 0.976 0.978 0.983 0.812 0.958 0.991 0.998 1.000   43
 Table  A1  continued 
Panel B: Average correlation coefficients   
0.965  0.970 0.955 0.968 0.966 0.950 0.948 0.927 0.945 0.968 0.835 0.939 0.965 0.975 0.972 
0.967  0.975 0.969 0.975 0.982 0.947 0.969 0.907 0.967 0.971 0.972 0.979 0.980 0.980 0.978 
0.984  0.984 0.972 0.977 0.983 0.984 0.971 0.969 0.987 0.941 0.982 0.978 0.982 0.988 0.985 
0.971  0.985 0.974 0.974 0.981 0.971 0.982 0.972 0.974 0.972 0.981 0.976 0.976 0.983 0.971 
0.962  0.936 0.945 0.965 0.924 0.949 0.960 0.871 0.944 0.898 0.965 0.966 0.961 0.960 0.949 
0.973  0.973 0.965 0.976 0.888 0.963 0.962 0.958 0.970 0.936 0.970 0.962 0.963 0.955 0.967 
0.984  0.988 0.987 0.987 0.975 0.972 0.961 0.978 0.987 0.987 0.989 0.956 0.986 0.979 0.989 
0.981  0.967 0.921 0.972 0.957 0.956 0.979 0.939 0.967 0.978 0.941 0.979 0.959 0.975 0.978 
Panel A contains correlations coefficients for respondent i’s responses (over time) for the “institutions” aspect with those of respondent j   
for i, j, = 1,2,…,15.. Panel B contains the average of correlations for each aspect.    Thus, row 1 of Panel B contains the average  




Table A2: VAR lag length criteria 
Lag LogL  LR  FPE  AIC  SC  HQ 
0 102.6826  NA  2.33e-08  -9.062055  -8.913276  -9.027007 
1 112.3246  15.77780  2.22e-08  -9.120417  -8.525303  -8.980226 
2 125.8942  18.50406  1.55e-08  -9.535840  -8.494390  -9.290505 
3 145.4242  21.30544*  6.90e-09*  -10.49311  -9.005326*  -10.14263 
4 157.7805  10.10969  6.96e-09  -10.79823*  -8.864107  -10.34261* 
“LogL” gives the value of the log likelihood function, “LR” is the value for a likelihood ratio test of the indicated 
number of lags against the alternative of 0 lags, “FPE” is the final prediction error, “AIC” is the value of the 
Akaike Information Criterion, “SC” the value of the Schwarz Criterion and “HQ” the Hannan-Quinn criterion. An 
asterisk indicates lag order selected by the relevant criterion  45
Table A3: The estimated VAR model 
 G  Δlns  ΔlnFLI 
0.531917 -0.467372 -3.267427 
Gt-1 
[ 1.43507]  [-1.33035]  [-1.40997] 
-0.304242 0.400769 5.496997 
Gt-2 
[-0.85879]  [ 1.19355]  [ 2.48182] 
-0.189087 -0.854446 -3.141841 
Gt-3 
[-0.56530] [-2.69510] [-1.50236] 
0.160173 0.725492 1.288262 
Δlnst-1 
[ 0.68585]  [ 3.27754]  [ 0.88231] 
-0.132306 -0.442176 -0.248501 
Δlnst-2 
[-0.54768] [-1.93114] [-0.16453] 
0.017611 0.384939 -2.136607 
Δlnst-3 
[ 0.08604]  [ 1.98424]  [-1.66965] 
0.043247 0.028062 0.086700 
ΔlnFLIt-1 
[ 0.89628]  [ 0.61360]  [ 0.28739] 
0.000295 -7.39E-05 0.539642 
ΔlnFLIt-2 
[ 0.00747]  [-0.00197]  [ 2.18341] 
0.000361 0.026012 -0.066729 
ΔlnFLIt-3 
[ 0.01175]  [ 0.89257]  [-0.34712] 
0.074434 0.077132 0.126693 
CONST 
[ 2.33233]  [ 2.54991]  [ 0.63496] 
R
2  0.549612 0.646242 0.570679 
Adjusted R
2  0.237804 0.401332 0.273456 
LM Test of system autocorrelation 
 Lags  LM  p-value 
 1  11.81997  0.2237 
 2  5.836710  0.7561 
 3  11.25527  0.2586 
 4  11.32813  0.2539 
Note: estimated coefficients have t-statistics in brackets. 
 